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A Comparison of the Freedom of Speech of Workers in
French and American Law
PATRICK MORVAN*
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States stipulates that the
legislature will not enact any law limiting the freedom of speech.' The violation of this
supreme stipulation is cause for legal action based on section 1 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 which states
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State. . . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress .... 2
Moreover, the Fourteenth Amendment affirms in holding that "[n]o State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States."
3
Under the tutelary protection of these constitutional pillars, freedom of speech
should be solidly guaranteed if not venerated as an absolute principle. The reality is far
removed from this idyllic vision. As viewed from the United States by American
businesses and investors, European laws grant employees an excessively generous
amount of protection against employer authority and control. By contrast, as viewed
from the Old Continent (except for this insular monarchy drifting off our shores, called
the United Kingdom), America resembles hell for workers. The so-called doctrine of
"employment at will"4 alone embodies a conservative approach toward labor relations,
individual as well as collective, which is rather inconceivable in France and throughout
most of Europe.
A comparative study of the freedom of speech of employees underscores the giant
abyss separating European and American judicial systems. But, even if judges and
national legislators do not express the law in the same fashion, an analysis of the topic
nevertheless reveals a similar type of reasoning underlying the doctrine resulting in a
convergence of these varying legal cultures. This possibility of intellectual
convergence is apparent from our study of the freedom of expression such as it has
* Professor at the University of Paris II (Panthdon-Assas). This Article was originally
written in French and delivered as a conference paper at a symposium held by the Center for
American Law of the University of Paris II (Panthdon-Assas) on January 18-19, 2008. For the
French version of this Article, see Patrick Morvan, La libertg d'expression des travailleurs en
droitsfrangais et amricain, in LA LIBERTE D'ExPREssION AUX ETATS-UNIS ET EN EUROPE 173
(tlisabeth Zoller ed., 2008). Many thanks to Patrice Van Hyle-B.A. University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee, M.A. Institute of French Studies at New York University-for her translation.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech .... ).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
3. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
4. See infra text accompanying note 11.
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been accorded to workers in the United States. French law could on this account claim
to serve as an example-maybe even a model-in the search being conducted across
the Atlantic for a new type of legislation improving the rights of workers.
The phenomenon of close interdependence enhanced by mutual exchanges between
the labor laws of different countries is further highlighted by the "transposition" (the
term, as we shall see, is not improper) of the Sarbanes-Oxley law in Europe, which
launched the trend of "whistleblowing." Although this notion was previously
unrecognized within European labor codes, for example in France or in Germany, it
was welcomed and assimilated in these countries, after first undergoing a vigorous
overhaul. The right to privacy, however, sometimes conflicts with freedom of speech.
This is evident in the matter of electronic surveillance of employees. In comparison
with American law, French law seems, once again, to be on another planet.
I. "DESPERATELY SEEKING" THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE WORKPLACE
Several factors have led to a stranglehold on employees' freedom of expression in
the United States. 5 First is the decline of unionization. It is known that collective
bargaining tends to forestall employer decisions detrimental to the worker. A collective
agreement requiring "just grounds" for dismissal or one that surrounds staffreductions
in procedural guarantees serves to build a favorable framework for the freedom of
speech in the workplace. Shop stewards or union-management committees are precious
intermediaries relaying the voice of workers to company management. Without unions,
these beneficial processes vanish. Worse yet, the American legislature and U.S. courts
defend with equal ardor freedom of speech on the part of unions and that of the
employer to fight the unionization of its personnel and engage in antiunion electoral
propaganda.
6
Second, waves of collective dismissals (mass layoffs) introduced a shared feeling of
intense anxiety regarding job security and therefore encouraged employees to practice
self-censorship at their workplaces. After all, whether the economy is going through a
growth or recession cycle, self-censorship is kept alive and well in America by the
ideological myth of a "classless society"--a myth that inclines workers not to attribute
their ills and problems outwardly to an external conflict between economic forces-
and the intrinsic inequality of ownership that opposes them to their employers. Rather,
the prevailing culture today "promotes... docility, self-censorship and acceptance of
the hierarchy" in the workplace.7 Worse, this "culture implicitly turns workers against
each other."8 Continental Europe, however, is a completely different scenario. There,
the Marxist critique of liberalism firmly entrenched a confrontational structure of work
relations and very early on caused unions to claim new rights and liberties for the
5. David C. Yamada, Voices from the Cubicle: Protecting and Encouraging Private
Employee Speech in the Post-Industrial Workplace, 19 BERKLEY J. EMp. & LAB. L. 1, 8-21
(1998). Today, Yamada is a Professor at Suffolk University Law School. We borrow many ideas
from this specialist in workplace violence (bullying).
6. On this aspect (equally astonishing for a Continental European jurist), see Kate E.
Andrias, Note, A Robust Public Debate: Realizing Free Speech in Workplace Representation
Elections, 112 YALE L.J. 2415 (2003).
7. Yamada, supra note 5, at 11.
8. Id.
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benefit of individuals in an attempt to counterbalance the weight of employer authority
and power.
Third, the electronic surveillance of personnel, such as recording phone
conversations or e-mails, reviewing computer hard drives, and monitoring the comings
and goings of employees by badge, digital imprints, or geo-location using GPS, creates
the impression of constant employer surveillance. In other words, this "Big Brother"
approach creates feelings of being monitored at any time and in almost any place.
Naturally, this approach leads workers to become very careful about the content of
what they write and say.
This demise of the freedom of speech is rather ironic at a time when the democratic
participation of workers in business activities and the full development of employees in
the workplace have become constant refrains in the copious literature written on U.S.
management practices. But, this situation has historic roots. The typical American
worker of the nineteenth century was a farmer or independent merchant who knew
nothing about individual rights of workers and who did not perceive a relationship
between an employer and an employee other than one based on the agrarian model of
the feudal lord-serf relationship. It is thus very natural that the employment-at-will rule
(the discretionary nature of terminating the work contract) 9 has become the law of the
land. The promulgation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)' ° in 1935
confirmed the preeminence of a collective approach with respect to work relations
which lasted until the 1960s. At that time, the enactment of federal laws against various
forms of discrimination reestablished the worker as a possible beneficiary of individual
rights.
The potential foundations for protection of free speech in the workplace are
insufficient. Neither the First Amendment, nor state constitutions, nor the NLRA or
whistleblowing laws offer an effective shield to employees. Some authors are pressing
the government to pass a federal law that fills in the gaps and erases the anomalies.
French law could prove enlightening.
A. Concealed Judicial Foundations
The doctrine of employment at will states that, in the absence of a written contract
of specified duration (that is to say, in the presence of an ordinary contract of
unspecified duration), an employee can be dismissed "for good cause, for no cause or
even for cause morally wrong."" While this doctrine has not altogether disappeared, it
has been notably restricted since the second half of the nineteenth century through
legislative reforms and through common law exceptions.
The public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule provides grounds for an
action for wrongful discharge when an employer discharges a worker for a reason that
harms public order.12 Forty-three states have adopted a form ofpublic policy exception
9. See infra text accompanying note 11.
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000); see infra Part I.A.2.i.
11. Payne v. W. &Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884).
12. See Petermann v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959)
(affirming that it would be "obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary to public policy
and sound morality to allow an employer to discharge any employee ... on the ground that the
employee declined to commit perjury"); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834,
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(whereas seven states reject it in any form). Two other exceptions to the doctrine of
employment at will (the implied-contract exception, in thirty-eight states, and the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, in eleven states) consist, according to a
classical method of interpretation, of setting into motion implicit contractual
obligations that curb an employer's discretionary power of termination for the benefit
of the weaker party (the employee). The plaintiff who raises the public policy
exception must clarify the source from which the rule of transgressed public order
emanates, whether it concerns a constitution (federal or state), a law, a regulation, an
administrative rule, or even a judicial decision.' 3
1. The First Amendment and Individual State Constitutions
In surprising fashion, the First Amendment proves to be of little help when a worker
initiates an action for wrongful discharge claiming that he is the victim of reprisals and
guilty only of expressing himself. Freedom of expression offers workers a very frail
shelter. In most cases, the public policy exception is not applicable because the
Constitution does not provide the necessary material. Employees rarely have a say in
determining their work conditions 14 because American constitutional law erects two
mighty obstacles in the way of freedom of expression.
i. The Elusive Matter of Public Concern
The First Amendment was first called upon in cases implicating government
employees wishing to safeguard their right to freedom of expression. The U.S.
Supreme Court developed the public concern test in Pickering, according to which
"[t]he problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the
[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest
of the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees."' 5 The judge must exhibit a measured degree of
control when it comes to restricting the liberty of the worker to express himself, as a
citizen, on matters of public concern, while also having regard for the state's interest,
as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public service that it governs
through its personnel.
Afterwards, Connick v. Myers clarified the restrictive character of this "balance of
interests. ' 6 The case concerned an assistant district attorney who was dismissed
because of her refusal to accept a change of service and because she disseminated a
questionnaire to her colleagues regarding changes in internal policies, department
morale, the timeliness of implementing a grievance committee, the degree of
838-40 (Wis. 1983) (finding that the public policy exception "allows the discharged employee
to recover if the termination violates a well-established and important public policy").
13. See Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980) (denying a research
doctor the right to oppose doing research on a new substance in the name of the Hippocratic
Oath, which cannot be considered as a source of public order).
14. See Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical
Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REv. 351,411 (2002) ("American employees also
suffer from a lack of voice in workplace decision-making.").
15. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
16. See461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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confidence toward superiors, and to ascertain whether or not employees had been
pressured to contribute to political campaigns. She first initiated the case in federal
court, relying on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.17 She alleged that she had been dismissed for
exercising her constitutional right to freedom ofexpression. The district court reviewed
her request and ordered her to be reinstated with retroactive salary and payment for
damages and interest. The court deemed that the questionnaire had touched upon many
matters of public concern. The Supreme Court reversed, however, stating
When a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern,
but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most
unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to
review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in
reaction to the employee's behavior.18
Otherwise said, the case of a public employee only touches upon a matter of public
concern if it refers to a question of political or social order or impacts in a general way
the community at large. The protection deriving from the First Amendment is
inaccessible when a public employee expresses himself or herself not in the role of a
citizen on matters of public concern, but in the role of a worker on matters of personal
interest.19
Probably no supreme tribunal in Europe would ever affirm that a worker employed
in the public sector could somehow ever not act as a citizen: freedom of expression is
an innate prerogative of every human being regardless of whether or not a person
performs work or expresses himself on a matter of public, personal, or professional
concern. In all cases, a measure of proportionality must be used in order to restrict
infringements upon this natural liberty.
The ruling in Garceti v. Ceballos20 limited (if not buried) the reasoning in
Pickering with respect to public employees. Ceballos, a deputy district attorney,
discovered that an affidavit contained inaccurate material statements and reported this
finding to his superiors. He then followed up with a memo recommending that the case
be dismissed. His attempts were in vain. At the time of the hearing, Ceballos reiterated
his criticisms and the court rejected them. Protesting that his supervisors had
afterwards taken measures of retaliation against him in violation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, Ceballos brought a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
Supreme Court objected to the argument, affirming that
[The fact that] Ceballos expressed his views inside his office, rather than publicly,
is not dispositive.... [W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
18. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
19. See Feldman v. Balm, 12 F.3d. 730 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that the dismissal of a
university professor who accused a colleague of plagiarism did not violate his rights stemming
from the First Amendment); Pappas v. Giuliani, 118 F. Supp. 2d 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding
that a police officer's distribution of several hundred racist mailings in response to solicitations
from charities was not speech about a matter of public concern).
20. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
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employer discipline .... It is immaterial whether he experienced some personal
gratification from writing the memo; his First Amendment rights do not depend on
his job satisfaction. The sigificant point is that the memo was written pursuant to
Ceballos' official duties.
2
r
A public employee who expresses himself while exercising his work duties or
responsibilities does not act as a citizen vis-A-vis the First Amendment and as such is
not shielded by it from any disciplinary action of the employer. In addition
Public employees... often occupy trusted positions in society. When they speak
out, they can express views that contravene governmental policies or impair the
proper performance of governmental functions.... Restricting speech that owes
its existence to a public employee's professional responsibilities does not infringe
any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply
reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has
commissioned or created.
22
Nothing could justify judicial authority supplanting employer authority in this
instance. Public employees must not express opinions that contravene government
policies or hinder the efficiency of governmental functions in any way. Officially,
Ceballos does not signify a complete break from legal precedents that provide
constitutional protection for remarks made by public employees within, as well as
outside of, their job. The Court would like people to believe that the new rule applies
to remarks and conversations made by these workers in connection with their
professional capacity and duties, but there is still room for doubt. Justice Breyer, in a
dissenting opinion, argued that the Pickering test should remain fully applicable 23 and
24in fact, the Supreme Court was clearly divided (five votes to four) on that very issue.
Furthermore, the Ceballos ruling rests on a particularly optimistic view of the
protection that American laws would be able to offer to public employees. The Court,
in one way, seeks to reassure itself in observing that
Exposing governmental inefficiency and misconduct is a matter of considerable
significance. As the Court noted in Connick, public employers should, "as a matter
of good judgment," be "receptive to constructive criticism offered by their
employees." The dictates of sound judgment are reinforced by the powerful
network of legislative enactments-such as whistle-blower protection laws and
labor codes-available to those who seek to expose wrongdoing.
2 5
On the contrary, it comes into stark relief that the ruling in essence deprives
approximately twenty-two million public employees of any constitutional guarantee
against possible retaliation from their employers should they decide to expose any
21. Id. at421.
22. Id. at 419-22.
23. Id. at 446 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("In such an instance, I believe that courts should
apply the Pickering standard, even though the government employee speaks upon matters of
public concern in the course of his ordinary duties.").
24. See id. 418-19 (majority opinion)
25. Id. at 425 (citations omitted).
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irregularities detected during the performance of their job duties. Moreover, it is
illusory to think that the American body of law offered a satisfactory alternative of
protection.
In revealing fashion, Ceballos himself had rejected founding his appeal on the
Federal Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 or on California law, even though the
latter furnished an overabundant array of possibilities including the California Labor
Code,26 the California Government Code,27 and the California Whistleblower
Protection Act.28 This legal strategy has an explanation, however. According to a study
done by the National Whistleblowers Center,29 ninety-five percent of state laws relative
to whistleblowers award less protection than § 1983, notably because they do not cover
statements made inside the company or job, but only those made outside. In light of
such uncertainties, many public employees, like Ceballos, choose to file their lawsuits
within the constitutional framework of the First Amendment and § 1983 rather than
rely on state laws, under which they have little hope of success.
This approach goes against common sense: when a public employee reveals illegal
incidents discovered at work by reporting them to his supervisor, which is in the
interest of his employer, he may be discharged under Ceballos. Yet, if he decides
instead to place the debate within the public arena (by directly contacting the press, for
example) thereby removing himself from the perilous framework of his job duties, he is
protected by the First Amendment. In a way then, Ceballos encourages public
employees to break the chain of command and adopt an attitude otherwise more
subversive and detrimental to their employer's interests.
This conception has since become outdated, as the most recent laws protecting
whistleblowers adopted by Congress, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 30 and the Wendell H.
Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the Twenty-First Century,3' cover inside
as well as outside whistleblowing. Maintaining the inside/outside distinction sustains a
degree of legal insecurity that only serves to dissuade workers from expressing
themselves. Such subtleties are bound to escape ordinary mortals (if not jurists); they
gag the freedom of speech of workers. This situation, finally, harms the interests of the
government, whether federal or state, whose employees are akin to lookouts, quick to
perceive any signs of corruption, misappropriation of public funds, or abnormal
administrative management.
Fortunately, Ceballos sparked legislative action in both houses of Congress. The
Federal Employee Protection of Disclosures Act was introduced in the Senate on
26. Section 1102.5 protects employees in both the private and public sector who become
whistleblowers in order to denounce unlawful acts. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (West 2006).
27. Sections 53296 through 53298 protect municipal and county employees relating crass
cases of poor administration and/or abuses of authority. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § § 53296-53298
(West 2006).
28. California Whistleblower Protection Act, CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 8547-8547.12 (West
2006).
29. The National Whistleblowers Center (NWC) is a nonprofit organization, founded in
1988, that dispenses information on laws relative to whistleblower protection. See generally
National Whistleblowers Center, http://www.whistleblowers.org.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2006).
31. 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (2000).
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January 11, 2007 ("the Senate bill").32 The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act
of 2007 ("the House bill") was introduced by the House of Representatives on
February 12, 2007. 33 The House bill would have reinforced the protection accorded to
federal employee whistleblowers who work in areas related to national security and
extends it to joint contractors of the federal government. In a general way, it woud hve
affirmed that any disclosure made under a federal whistleblowing law concerning the
waste of public resources or fraud is to be protected without restriction as to time,
place, form, motive, context, or prior disclosure; formal or informal communication are
included therein. 34 The House bill aimed to respond to Ceballos as well as to various
legal decisions that have narrowed the field of denunciations covered by federal laws.
Too often, a whistleblower who feels that he has been punished submits his
complaint to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) 35 or to the Office of Special
Counsel (OSC), 36 where it remains pending or is resolved only much later, usually after
his contract has long been severed and years after he received his last salary.
Accordingly, the bill also allows whistleblowers to refer cases to federal district courts
if the MSPB or the OSC fail to undertake any action within 180 days of the filing of
the complaint.37 On appeal, each federal court of appeals will thus be deemed
competent and no longer will the court of appeals for the federal circuit hold exclusive
jurisdiction.
In the end, the Senate bill was approved by the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs on June 13, 2007.38 The White House, invoking
national security concerns, vowed to veto the House bill if it was adopted by
Congress. 39 The Bush Administration's national security justification seemed
misplaced, however, for national security seems to call for the encouragement of
denunciations of unlawful acts inside the Administration. Despite the White House
veto threat, the Senate bill passed by unanimous consent on December 17, 2007.40
32. S. 274, 110th Cong. (2007).
33. H.R. 985, 110th Cong. (2007).
34. See id.
35. The MSPB is an independent administrative agency of a judicial nature that punishes
illegal practices (partisan influences, notably) affecting the federal merit system and ensures the
protection of public agents working in agencies against management abuse. It also receives
statements made by whistleblowers within the framework of the Whistleblower Protection Act
of 1989. Its decisions can be appealed before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
See generally U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board,
http://www.mspb.gov/sites/mspb/default.aspx/.
36. The OSC typically handles allegations of retaliation from employees of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), the regulating authority for financial markets. See generally
U.S. Office of Special Counsel, http://www.osc.gov.
37. See H.R. 985.
38. S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Meeting Results (June 13,
2007), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/061307BusMtgRpt.pdf.
39. See Statement of Administration Policy, Office of Mgmt. and Budget, Executive Office
of the President (Mar. 13, 2007), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/I 10-1/hr985sap-h.pdf.
40. See Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2007-Source Watch,
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=WhistleblowerProtectionEnhancementAct-of
2007.
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Recently, the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 20094' was introduced
in the Senate on February 3, 2009. Compared to the previous initiative, the legislation
strengthens whistleblower protections to federal employees who expose fraud, waste
and abuse. Likewise, it extends whistleblower protections to employees of all
government contractors-such as the private recipients of stimulus funds-given that
no similar safeguard was included when Congress passed the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008.42 The Congress is now aware that the lack of surveillance
over the private companies contracting with federal, state and local governments could
shatter the hopes of success embodied in the "bailout" of the U.S. financial system.
ii. The Insurmountable Requirement of State Action
The Supreme Court has often invoked, since its Civil Rights Cases decision,43 the
principle firmly embedded in American constitutional law by which the "action"
inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only that which can be
attributed to the state. That is, the text raises no barrier against purely private conduct,
even if it is discriminatory or illicit.44 In the same way, the First Amendment,
forbidding Congress from making any laws abridging the freedom of speech, aims
solely at the action of a government, federal or state, capable of infringing this civil
liberty.45 "It is, of course, a commonplace that the constitutional guarantee of free
speech is a guarantee only against abridgment by government, federal or state." ' In a
general way, the Constitution only encompasses governmental and not private behavior
(with the exception of the Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibits slavery). To use a
metaphor, the Constitution is not applied horizontally-among individuals or private
entities-but rather vertically-between an individual or a private entity and a state or
an entity embodying the state.
Yet, the rule can be circumvented in certain situations where the action of the
government "intertwines" with that of private parties accused of having violated
constitutional laws. For example, if a public function is involved,47 if judicial
41. S. 372, 11 lth Cong. (2009).
42. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765.
43. 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (establishing that the action inhibited by the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the states and that
the Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or
wrongful).
44. See id.
45. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
46. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976).
47. The public function theory was introduced by the Supreme Court regarding a "whites-
only" park, which was bequeathed by a senator to a city on the condition that racial segregation
would continue. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). The Court noted that "[c]onduct that is
formally 'private' may become so entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a
governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state
action," and "when private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or
functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and
subject to its constitutional limitations." Id. at 299. In Evans, the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was recognized as applicable. See id. at 298.
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enforcement is involved,48 or if there is a symbiotic relationship between the State and
a private party.49 In other words, there are times, at least from the vantage point of the
First Amendment, when private property is treated as if it were public.
In Marsh v. Alabama,5 ° the Supreme Court was called upon to issue a judgment
regarding the application of the First Amendment to Chickasaw, a company town in
Alabama belonging entirely to a commercial business. A Jehovah's Witness, who had
begun distributing religious literature on a street comer, was summoned to cease his
activity. After refusing to do so, he was sued and convicted of trespassing on another's
property. The Court threw out this conviction, judging that Chickasaw was the
functional equivalent of a municipality, that the residents were citizens of the state and
of the country, and that the First Amendment was fully applicable toward the
expression of their activities on sidewalks and in streets (purely private) of this city. In
short, these places had a public function.
In Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,51
which occurred at a time when Supreme Court jurisprudence was at the height of its
liberal period under the leadership of Justice Warren, a decision was handed down
concerning employees protesting their work conditions. In this decision, the rule
contained in Marsh was extended to opinions expressed in the parking lot of a
suburban commercial complex. The Court deemed that shopping centers today are in
essence the equivalent of the downtown commercial areas of yesteryear.
Nevertheless, in Hudgens v. NLRB,52 which concerned a group of unionists
participating in a peaceful strike within the confines of a private shopping mall, the
Court broke with the precedent set in Logan Valley. The Court recalled that, in a case
decided subsequently to Logan Valley,53 it had restricted the holding of Logan Valley
to words aimed at one of the merchants present in the shopping center and judged that
the First Amendment did not confer the right of distributing antiwar pamphlets inside a
large suburban mall. 54 The Court concluded that the legal reasoning underlying Logan
Valley had therefore been rejected by Tanner, and that the time had come to bury
48. The judicial enforcement theory qualifies the legal implementation of private
discrimination as State action, where appeals brought before courts in the State of Missouri
allowed the expulsion of members of a black family from a house they had purchased in
violation of a contract signed by the white owners. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
The contract contained a stipulation barring those not belonging to the Caucasian race from
having any occupancy rights. See id. at 4-5. According to the Supreme Court, "in granting
judicial enforcement of the restrictive agreements in these cases, the States have denied
petitioners the equal protection of the laws." Id. at 20; see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 500 U.S. 614, 618-22 (1991) (finding the objection to black members sitting on a civil jury
as constituting an action of the government to the degree that federal law authorizes such an
objection and whereby justice lends assistance to this type of racial discrimination by clearing
its perpetrator).
49. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (deeming that the presence
of a symbiotic relationship between the city and the private perpetrators of discrimination served
as support for the Fourteenth Amendment violation).
50. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
51. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
52. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
53. Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
54. See id. at 570.
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Logan Valley for good.5 In summary, the Court held that the Constitution could in no
way require the public appropriation of private property. 56 The Court indicated,
however, that this decision did not alter the holding in Marsh, which continues to
preserve freedom of speech in company towns located on private property.57
Hudgens did not put an end to the saga of the public function theory in commercial
centers. In many state constitutions, the requirement of state action is invisible. Thus,
for example, the California Constitution provides, without restriction, that "[e]very
person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of
speech or press."58 No condition tied to state action is posited. Accordingly, the idea
thus developed that state constitutions were likely to bore a hole into the wall of the
First Amendment, obstructed by the state action requirement. In fact, several state
supreme courts decided that freedom of speech, as defined by their own constitutions,
granted to citizens the right to express themselves in public areas within the confines of
private shopping centers. The most renowned decision, emanating from the California
Supreme Court in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,59 extended this constitutional
protection of substitution to high school students who had solicited signatures for a
petition opposing a United Nations resolution against Zionism in a private shopping
mall. The Supreme Court did not take offense to the existence of this loophole to
Hudgens. Instead, the Court voted unanimously that a state does not violate the First
Amendment by interpreting its constitution in such a way as to grant citizens the right
to reasonably express themselves by circulating petitions in private shopping malls.
60
In almost all of these cases, it seems, courts limit the application of the First
Amendment. Employees in the private sector, who are arguably even worse off than
employees in the public sector, can be certain that a wrongful discharge lawsuit will
not thrive on the foundation of the Federal Constitution. The individual who expresses
himself in a commercial center or at his place of work is stripped from the
constitutional protection of the First Amendment. On this point, a large chasm
separates French law from American law. French law, by virtue of Articles 10 and 11
of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of August 26, 1789,
unconditionally guarantees the freedom of speech.61 In addition to this constitutional
corpus, we must add Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights62 and
55. Hudgens, 424 U.S at 519.
56. Id. at 519 ("The Constitution by no means requires such an attenuated doctrine of
dedication of private property to public use." (quoting Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 569)).
57. See id.
58. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(a).
59. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
60. See id
61. THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CTiZEN art. 10 (1789) (Fr.) ("No
one shall be disquieted on account of his opinions, including his religious views, provided their
manifestation does not disturb the public order established by law."); id art. 11 ("The free
communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of man. Every
citizen may, accordingly, speak, write, and print with freedom, but shall be responsible for such
abuses of this freedom as shall be defined by law.").
62. Article 10 states:
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Article 11 of the new European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights,63 which both
authorize every citizen to take legal action without having to prove state action.
Even though the European Convention on Human Rights applies only to member
states of the Council of Europe and the people coming under their jurisdiction in a
vertical direction, the European Court of Human Rights manages the theory of
affirmative obligations in order to make horizontal the rights and liberties enacted by
the Convention. Additionally, the Court of Cassation directly targets the European
Convention on Human Rights in an effort to impose respect for private relations
(horizontal), specifically regarding work contracts that bind employers and employees.
Freedom of expression is an integral part of French internal law, while freedom of
expression in American law stumbles over the requirement of state action. French and
European law, however, resemble the constitutional provisions of individual states in
the United States which, following the example of the California Constitution,
recognize the freedom of speech in its entirety.
Until now, doctrinal appeals in favor of reform of the classical analysis 64 have
received only lip service. Professor Lisa B. Bingham,65 in particular, has advanced a
solid argument that offers effective protection to employees in the private sector while
at the same time preserving the dogma of state action. She emphasizes that the role
delegated to a state court to which a case for wrongful discharge has been referred
alone characterizes state action.66 Specifically, when a court affirms that the
Constitution does not cover the spoken comments of a worker, it denies him, as an
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema
enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the
interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 10, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230.
63. The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, initially adopted on December 7,
2000, having no legally binding authority, was again proclaimed on December 14, 2007. 2007
O.J. (C 364) 1. It will enter into force-and this time be mandatory-following the ratification
of the Lisbon treaty by twenty-seven member states of the European Union, which must
intervene by June 2009 at the latest. Article 11 provides that "[e]veryone has the right to
freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and
impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers." Id. at 11.
64. See Lisa B. Bingham, Employee Free Speech in the Workplace: Using the First
Amendment as Public Policyfor Wrongful Discharge Actions, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 341 (1994);
Terry Ann Halbert, The First Amendment in the Workplace: An Analysis and Callfor Reform,
17 SETON HALL L. REv. 42, 70 (1987).
65. See Bingham, supra note 64.
66. See id.
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organ of the state, the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.67
In other words, the refusal of a state judge to include freedom of speech in the notion
of public order and his subsequent decision to nonsuit the worker who raised the public
policy exception would eclipse the private act of the job dismissal attributable to the
employer and highlight the causal role of the jurisdictional public act. If one claims
that the argument is representative of the decision in Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete
Co.,68 it starts a vicious cycle that weakens the decision. For if it is considered that the
judge is joining camp with the private employer, and in some way, is standing by his
side in the role of codefendant, the dispute can no longer be settled in an impartial
manner other than by using another court; but the other court, in turn, will have to
recuse itself for the benefit of a third jurisdiction if it foresees nonsuiting the worker,
and so on. The reality is that a state court contributes in no way to the violation of the
freedom of speech whose applicability it excludes. Its natural function consists simply
of determining whether or not the First Amendment is applicable. This prior
determination produces its material competence; it is not united by a link of causality
to the wrongful dismissal, the sole and true cause of the damage sustained by the
worker whose freedom of speech has been gagged.
There is another foreseeable approach which consists of imposing affirmative
obligations on states to protect the freedom of speech. The idea comes from the
dissenting opinion issued by Justice Black in Feiner v. New York.6 9 According to
Justice Black, it would be the government's duty to protect the right of people to
express themselves freely as well as to punish others that disrupt the enjoyment of said
right.70 This reasoning is occasionally adhered to by the European Court on Human
Rights in its attempts to increase the horizontal scope (in relationships between private
individuals) of the European Convention.7'
2. Legislative Foundations
There are statutes that without a doubt protect workers' freedom of speech. But in
the end, they prove disappointing as well.
i. The National Labor Relations Act
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), or Wagner Act,72 signed by President
Roosevelt on July 5, 1935, governs collective relations between unions and
management in the private sector. It is implemented by the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB), under the control of federal courts, by an independent authority
endowed with jurisdictional power including the power of injunction over management
and unions suspected of unfair labor practice. The NLRA, although amended in hostile
67. See id.
68. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
69. 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
70. See id. at 327-28.
71. See Jean-Frangois Flauss, The European Court of Human Rights and the Freedom of
Expression, 84 IND. L.J. 809, 812 (2009).
72. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
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fashion by the Labor-Management Relations Act 73 to include union rights and the right
to strike, offers normative support to freedom of expression within private companies.
This support is, unfortunately, crippled by restrictive conditions. Moreover, many
jurists ignore the very existence of this legal protection.
Section 7 of the NLRA, entitled "Rights of Employees," stipulates that
"[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection.... "7 Within this context of strong trade unionism, it is
worth recalling that the concept of concerted activity applies to all employees and not
only to those affiliated with unions or participating in collective bargaining. As for the
remainder of the text, its magnitude gets reduced to almost nothing by a series of
requirements.
First, according to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Prill v. NLRB,75
[A]n employee's action may be concerted for the purposes of the NLRA only if the
action is "engaged in with or on the authority of other employees, and not solely
by and on behalf of the employee himself" . .. A worker no longer takes
"concerted" action by himself unless he acts on the authority of his fellow
workers.
76
This legal precedent strongly calls to mind the definition of a strike given by the
French Court of Cassation: "A strike is a concerted and collective suspension of work
in view of backing up professional demands; an employee, except in the case where he
is obeying an order formulated at the national level, cannot claim to exercise the right
to strike in isolation., 77 Besides the case of a strike order launched at the national level,
this rule has a logical and almost anecdotal exception: "[Iln companies where there is
only one worker, this worker, who is the only person capable of presenting and
defending his professional demands, can exercise this constitutionally recognized
right., 78 But, where French law restricts only the exercise of the right to strike (and
very minimally), American law prohibits any individual action purporting to defend a
legitimate social interest (such as safety of the worker). The solution of the Prill
holding is unjust and artificial because it would have been sufficient for the plaintiff to
have a work colleague rally to his cause or to speak also in his name, in order to benefit
from legal protection.
73. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-167, 171-187, 557 (2000)). This law has come to be
known as the "Taft-Hartley" law.
74. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
75. 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
76. Id. at 1482-83. Prill was a truck driver who, after an accident caused by the poor
condition of his truck's brakes, alerted his employer. Getting no response, he then went to the
authorities, which immobilized the vehicle. He was later dismissed because the company could
not tolerate his "calling the cops like this all the time." Id. at 1482.
77. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court ofordinaryjurisdiction,
social chamber], Mar. 29, 1995, Bull. civ. V, No. 111.
78. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court ofordinaryjurisdiction,
social chamber], Nov. 13, 1996, Bull. civ. V, No. 379.
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Second, the requirement of "mutual aid and protection" is likely to limit the
freedom of expression in order to safeguard the common interest and not the specific
interest of workers.
Third, the NLRA excludes many categories of workers. For example, it does not
cover independent workers, agricultural workers, domestic employees, managers, or
supervisors. 79 The Taft-Hartley law, in effect, excluded supervisors from the field of
the NLRA by defining them as follows:
The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest of the
employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign,
reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust
their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the
foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical
nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.80
An employee must be qualified as a supervisor if he assumes any of the twelve
aforementioned duties, displays "independent judgment," and holds his authority in the
interest of the employer. The Supreme Court subsequently condemned this restrictive
interpretation and the requirement of the NLRB that the burden of proof rest on the
employer.81 In a revealing fashion, and to the embarrassment of the NLRB, it was not
until October 3, 2006 that the Court decided to resolve the Kentucky River case.
Although the notion of supervisor, which goes back to 1947, is today somewhat archaic
and seriously limits the right of millions of workers to engage in collective action, the
Supreme Court foiled the attempts of the NLRB to restrict it.
ii. Statutes Protecting Whistleblowers
a. American Law
As has been shown, the United States has many laws ensuring whistleblower
protection-that is, protection of an employee who reports or denounces a dangerous
or unlawful activity to a public authority against the risk of retaliation from his private,
or especially public, employer. Sectors that particularly run the risk of offense include
companies listed on the stock exchange, credit institutions, and accounting and
financial firms. Activities that run the risk of offense include environmental protection.
There are numerous possibilities relating to environmental protection including water
quality, air pollution, mining operations, waste disposal, toxic substance management,
and pipeline security. Additional environmental examples include ground
transportation, maritime activities, and air transportation. Moreover, discrimination and
infringement of civil liberties occurs in the areas of job, health, or work security;
regulation of work conditions and salary; criminal investigations; public works
contracts; ethics of federal personnel; military activities; and tax fraud all raise the
possibility of offense. To this end, dozens of tests have been adopted. 2
79. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000).
80. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11).
81. See NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001).
82. For an extensive review of laws and regulations, see STEPHEN M. KoHN, FEDERAL
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Thus, according to a classic example, the nonretaliation provision of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act,83 stipulates that
[n]o person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee
because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be
instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter or has testified or is
about to testify in any such proceeding or because of the exercise by such
employee on behalf of himself or others of any right afforded by this chapter.
84
The text adds that any worker who feels that he has been discharged or otherwise
discriminated against in violation of this rule can, within thirty days following the
violation, submit a formal complaint to the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), the federal agency handling such investigations.8 5 If
necessary, OSHA can refer the matter to a district court in order to obtain reinstatement
of the employee.
OSHA is also competent to handle similar complaints submitted within the
framework of the sixteen other whistleblower protection statutes involving land, air and
rail transport, nuclear energy, pipelines, environmental protection, and more.8
6
Appearing on this list is section 806 of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud
Accountability Act of 2002 (CCFA), 7 which protects employees of publicly traded
companies who provide evidence of fraud.88 Section 806 protects members of
Congress and managerial whistleblowers from any discriminatory measure that results
from their denunciation of acts violating rules imposed on publicly traded companies
by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). Section 806 also protects these
individuals when the information is furnished to a member of Congress or in cases
where investigations are conducted by a federal agency. At the same time, many states
have adopted a general whistleblower statute. All of these legal provisions can be
invoked as a public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule89 in order to
demonstrate wrongful discharge.
But these laws are a patchwork. Their field of application varies considerably and
the conditions for granting legal protection are diverse. Thus, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 196490 offers extended protection to whistleblowers:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment
agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other
WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS AND REGULATIONS (2008).
83. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2000).
84. Id. § 660(c)(1).
85. Id. § 660(c)(2).
86. See OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION PROGRAM, http://www.osha.gov/dep/oia/whistleblower.
87. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 800 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1348, 1514A,
1519, 1520 (2006)).
88. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006).
89. See Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884).
90. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6
(2000)). Title VII deals in part with discrimination for making charges, testifying, assisting, or
participating in enforcement proceedings.
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training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate
against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any
member thereof or applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice
made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made
a charge, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
9 1
Sometimes federal case law generously interprets this provision by requiring only from
the plaintiff that he justify with reasonable belief that the act denounced was illegal, not
of confirmed illegality. Moreover, on January 26, 2009, the Supreme Court decided a
case concerning a public employee who had testified not spontaneously but in response
to questions from an investigator regarding acts of sexual harassment at his workplace.
The Court decided that the antiretaliation provision's protection of42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
3(a)-which makes it unlawful "for an employer to discriminate against any...
employe[e]" who "has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by
this subchapter"--extends to an employee who speaks out about discrimination not on
her own initiative but in answering questions during an employer's internal
investigation.92
The aforementioned Sarbanes-Oxley Act likewise targets the employee who
reasonably believes that the conduct he is denouncing is illegal. By contrast, certain
federal laws, including those interpreted by state judges, require that the whistleblower
prove a definite violation of the law. Under these conditions, it is no wonder that "only
the surest, or dumbest, of private-sector employees would be willing to report illegal
activity under the assumption that they are covered by law."
93
Statutes protecting whistleblowers are equally weakened by a distinction between
internal and external denunciations. Generally, only denunciations made to competent
administrative authorities are protected. Denunciations made to company supervisors
or managers are covered only by certain texts (for example, section 806 of the
aforementioned CCFA) and under specific conditions that result in completely
dissuading employees from pursuing this course of action. The logic behind this
distinction is strange because it seems to encourage employees to squelch criticisms
made internally and to instead carry their disgruntlements to the public arena, to a
public authority, or even to the media, usually to the detriment of the company.94
Connecticut could be cited as a model95 since it is the only state to have adopted a
law that comprehensively protects employees in both private and public sectors. In
reality, however, local jurisprudence transposes here the "public concern test" which,
since Connick v. Myers,96 banishes freedom of expression when contentious acts or
comments involve the personal interests of employees and not matters of public
concern, even if the notion of public concern seems sometimes overestimated.97
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
92. Crawford v. Metro. Gov't, 129 S. Ct. 846, 850 (2009).
93. Yamada, supra note 5, at 40.
94. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), for more on this criticism.
95. See Halbert, supra note 64, at 70.
96. 461 U.S. 138 (1993).
97. See Daley v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 734 A.2d 112 (Conn. 1999) (upholding the
termination of an employee upon her return from maternity leave after she had criticized her
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b. Whistleblowing in French Law
The surge within Europe of the whistleblowing concept is a product of section 301
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 98 according to which: "Each audit committee shall establish
procedures for-(A) the receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints received by the
issuer regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing matters; and (B)
the confidential, anonymous submission by employees of the issuer of concerns
regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters."99 As a result, this provision of
offshore reach constrained European subsidiaries of American companies and groups
of European companies traded on U.S. stock exchanges to implement so-called "ethics
alert" systems which use toll-free numbers or hotlines to offer whistleblowers an
appropriate resource for the denunciation of any accounting and financial irregularities
or corrupt acts which have come to their knowledge. In France, these whistleblowing
systems implemented in 2002 created an unprecedented overlap between American and
French law. The overlap ended up having a negative impact on this innovation. It must
be said that the ghost of informing, inherited from the darkest hours in France's history,
is still alive and well. It has never ceased to hover around the matter ofwhistleblowing
and explains, more than a supposed anti-Americanism, the violent reactions sparked by
this practice.
Initially, the French National Data Protection Agency (CNIL) 00 expressed, in two
decisions on May 26, 2005,101 very strong reservations concerning the validity of
"professional informant" systems that had been put into effect by McDonald's France
and Compagnie Europdenne d'Accumulateurs (CEAC) with regard to Act No. 78-17 of
January 6, 1978 on Data Processing, Data Files and Individual Liberties ("Data
Protection Act"). 10 2 This law subordinates the implementation of "automatically
processed personal data" to prior declarations made to the CNIL and, in certain cases,
requires CNIL approval. In support of its rejection, the CNIL recalled in particular that
according to the first article of the 1978 law, "information technology must be at the
service of each citizen. It must not infringe on personal identity, on human rights, one's
private life or individual or public freedoms."'1 3 Moreover, Article 7 of the Data
Protection Act requires that the processing of personal data obtain, in advance,
"consent from the concerned party" or fulfill one of the following conditions: "meeting
employer for failing to implement its highly publicized family friendly workplace policies).
98. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2006).
99. Id. § 78j-l(m)(4). In publicly traded companies, the "audit committee" must establish a
procedure allowing employees to submit in a confidential and anonymous manner any dubious
financial record-keeping and audit accounting situations.
100. The CNIL is an independent administrative authority responsible for ensuring the protection of
personal information and data. See generally CMIL, http/Aww.cnil.fr/index.phpid=4.
101. See CEAC & Exide Techs., CNIL Decision No. 2005-111 (May 26, 2005), available at
httpJ/www.legifiance.gouv.fr/affichCnil.do?oldAction=redWExpCnil&d=CNlLTEXT00017653327&
fistReqld=326767900&fi.tPos=l ;McDonald's, CNIL Decision No. 2005-110(May26, 2005),avaiabe
athttp.Avww.legifance.gouv.fr/affichCnil.do?oldAction=rediExpCilid=CNILTEXT00017653326&
fistReqld=1321386284&fastPos=l.
102. An English translation of the Data Protection Act is available at
http://www.cnil.fr/fileadmin/documents/uk/78-17VA.pdf.
103. Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, Journal Officiel de la Rrpublique Francaise [J.O.]
[Official Gazette of France], Jan. 7, 1978, p. 227.
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legal obligations incumbent upon the processor of data information" or "carrying out
such activities with the legitimate interest in mind, under the provision that the interests
or fundamental rights and liberties of the concerned party are not disregarded by the
data information processor or its recipient." 1°4 The penultimate requirement is
excluded in this case as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is not a French law, but it does
undeniably establish the "legitimate interest" of companies traded on U.S. stock
exchanges to put into place a whistleblowing system in France.
Finally, European Union Directive No. 95-46 of October 24, 1995105 (incorporated
in France by Law No. 2004-801, which modified the Data Protection Act) prohibits the
transfer of personal data to a non-member state of the European Community that does
not offer an "adequate level of protection." The United States is not considered to offer
an adequate level of protection.
Numerous opinions have ordered and continue to order the withdrawal of
whistleblowing systems put into place at companies in contempt of the Data Protection
Act. But the CNIL did an immediate turnaround. On December 8, 2005, a delegation
of its members met with staff from the SEC in Washington, D.C. The CNIL observed
that during the meeting, it failed to find "any major incompatibility" between section
301(4) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and "the orientation document" it had just created.
The contents of this document were incorporated into Decision No. 2005-305 of
December 8, 2005, "having sole authorization over the automatic processing of
personal data implemented within the framework of whistleblowing systems."',
0 6
From this time on, the validity of whistleblowing systems vis-A-vis the January 6,
1978 law is acquired in accordance with the law. A simplified declaration from the
CNIL is in and of itself sufficient as long as the systems meet the conditions outlined in
the decision of December 8, 2005. The December 8, 2005 decision delineates the
categories of data that can be processed in total confidentiality, necessitates obtaining
the identity of the issuer of the alert (anonymity must remain the exception), permits
the transfer of data to the United States on the condition that the company adheres to
the Safe Harbor Framework, 10 7 requires informing potential system users of its
procedures, and above all, requires informing the person designated by the
whistleblower that she has the right to access the data as well as to demand its
correction (a condition rarely met by whistleblowing systems). 10 8 The fact remains,
however, that the CNIL is still not competent to apply labor law, which can raise other
obstacles.
Initially, there was no conflict between American and French labor law. Conflict
developed over time when the companies concerned began adopting a very broad
interpretation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, often inviting their personnel to denounce
104. Id.
105. Council Directive 95/46, arts. 25-26, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).
106. Decision No. 2005-305 of Dec. 8, 2005, Journal Officiel de la Rdpublique Frangaise
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Jan. 4, 2006, p. 79.
107. The U.S.-European Union Safe Harbor Framework allows American companies to
conform with EC Directive 95/46 concerning the protection of personal data and information if
they fully demonstrate adherence to a body of seven international principles on the respect for
one's private life. See generally U.S. Department of Commerce, Welcome to the Safe Harbor,
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor.
108. See Decision No. 2005-305 of Dec. 8, 2005.
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activities, using company whistleblowing systems (under various names such as code
of good conduct, ethics charter, etc.), that were foreign to the preoccupations of
Congress-whose principal target was only accounting and financial fraud or other acts
of corruption.
Several high courts' °9 have condemned whistleblowing systems for having too far a
reach-typically because of the blatant violations of the Data Protection Act. For
example, the code of ethics (called the Code of Business Conduct) implemented in
2004 within the Dassault Systimes group asked staffto notify management of breaches
regarding intellectual property rights, disclosures of strictly confidential information,
internal conflicts, insider trading, unlawful discrimination, and incidents of
psychological or sexual harassment jeopardizing the vital interest of the group or the
physical or psychological well-being of an individual. Certainly, this list only contained
acts that were already prohibited by French law. But notably, an employee is not the
intermediary of the public. In the Dassault Systimes case, the Tribunal de grande
instance de Nanterre deemed that the code's scope was too broad and risked
encouraging slanderous denunciations (themselves criminally reprehensible). I 0 As a
result, the extension of the whistleblowing system to these categories was
"disproportionate to the goals pursued" according to the terms of Article 7 of the Data
Protection Act. Worse, certain codes disregard the right to respect one's private life or
the dignity of employees by including shortcomings that fall within the domain of
morality: the marital infidelity of an employee can be denounced, apriori, even though
it hardly poses a threat to the interests of the company.
On a more technical note, many charters or ethics codes, in as much as they
encompass "general and permanent regulations" according to Article L. 1321-5
(former Article L. 122-39) of the Labor Code,"' have been described as being a mere
supplement to the company's own handbook of rules and regulations. Now, such a
supplement can only be introduced after holding consultations with delegates elected
by the work staff and previously informing the government labor inspector.
B. Freedom of Speech and Employees' "Right of Expression" in French Law"12
Is there a possibility that American legislators could draw their inspiration from
French law? They would find therein a peaceful coexistence between "freedom" of
speech, vast in scope and magnitude, and the "right" of expression, defined and
conditioned in favor of employees, without distinction as to who one is or what one
does.
109. For some examples, see Charte tthique et Alerte Professionnelle en Dgbat, 1310
SEMAINE SocIALE LAMY SuPp. 75 (2007) (Fr.).
110. Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Nanterre,
Oct. 19, 2007. For a summary of this case, see Annulation d'un dispositif d'alerte
professionnelle LIAwSOSS SOCLALES, BREF SOCIAL, Dec. 5, 2007, at 1 (Fr.).
111. C. TRAv. art. L. 122-39.
112. The rulings of the French Cassation Court cited hereafter are available at
Legifiance.gouv.fr, La jurisprudence judiciaire,
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/initRechJuriJudi.do.
1034 [Vol. 84:1015
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE WORKPLA CE
1. Employees
In 1982, in the wake of the Auroux Report,' 13 a French legislator wanted to open up
business establishments to democracy and grant a new type of "citizenship" to
employees in order to fill in the gap "between the situation of dependence of
employees at their workplace and the freedom of speech acquired in the city."' 14 It is
this hurdle that American law refuses to jump over: the employee cannot be regarded
as a citizen within the company when he expresses himself on matters of personal
concern (employees in the private sector) or within the scope of his job duties
(employees in the public sector).
Law No. 82-689 of August 4, 1982 instituted, for the benefit of employees, "the
right to direct and collective expression regarding the content, conditions and
organization of their work .... The opinions put forward by employees, regardless of
their ranking in the organizational chart, in the exercise of their right of expression,
cannot lead to their punishment or dismissal."'"15 The uniqueness of this right of
expression has been underscored in that it is both a collective right to participation and
an individual right to express one's own opinion within the group. Like the right to
strike, the right of expression would thus be deemed an individual right that is
exercised and enjoyed collectively.
Law No. 86-1 of January 3, 1986 added several clarifications regarding the purpose
of the right of expression: "The purpose of this expression is to outline the steps to be
taken so as to improve work conditions, the organization of work activity and the
quality of production in the work area where employees are assigned and within the
company."'" 6 The obligation to negotiate the terms for exercising the right of
expression (introduced in 1982) was extended to all companies having an appointed
union delegate; the right of expression was to be enjoyed and exercised during work
hours and on work premises. The time devoted to this expression was to be paid in the
same manner as ordinary work time.
1 17
The only thing remaining was to combine the right of expression with that of
freedom of speech. Did the first overshadow the second? Did the special rule depart
from the general principle? In France, the right of expression is simply a restricted and
particular form of freedom of speech which remains in full force both in and out of
company confines. This is the major difference between French and American law. The
latter, in reality, under the guise of freedom of speech, only recognizes a strictly
conditioned and limited right of expression. In a case concerning a financial
administrative director dismissed for having sent a document critical of the new
113. JEAN AUROUX, REPORT ON THE RIGHTS OF WORKERS (1981).
114. Mich~le Bonnechere, Expression des Travailleurs sur les Conditions etL 'Organisation
du Travail, un Droit i Saisir, DROrr OUVRIER, Dec. 1982, at 463 (quoting Mine G. Toutain)
(Fr.).
115. Law No. 82-689 of Aug. 4, 1982, Journal Officiel de la Rdpublique Frangaise [J.0.]
[Official Gazette of France], Aug. 6, 1982, p. 2520. This provision, as amended, is currently
known as C. TRAv. art. L. 2281-1 and L. 2281-3.
116. Law No. 86-1 of Jan. 3, 1986, Journal Officiel de la R~publique Frangaise [J.0.]
[Official Gazette of France], Jan. 4, 1986, p. 199 (amending C. TRAY. art. L. 461-1 to become
art. L. 2281-1 and L. 2281-3).
117. See id. (amending C. TRAV. art. L. 461-2).
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organization put into place by management to members of the board of directors on
which he served, the French Court of Cassation stated that:
If, with good reason, the Court of Appeal judged that the act for which the
employee was being reprimanded could not be connected to the right of expression
of employees regarding the content, conditions and organization of their work as
provided for by Article L. 461-1 of the Labor Code, which is exercised and
enjoyed only within the framework of collective meetings organized on work
premises and during work time, it disregarded the fact that, with the exception of
cases of abuse, the employee still enjoys within as well as outside of the company,
his individual right of speech and as a result, no restrictions can be placed upon
this right except for those that are justified by the nature of the task to accomplish
and in proportion to the goal pursued.
118
Otherwise stated, within the company, the employee enjoys the right of expression
according to narrowly defined circumstances and under specific terms. As a
consequence, "the conversations held by an employee outside of the company do not
constitute an exercise of the right of expression as set forth by Article L. 461-1 of the
Labor Code" even if the employee who hurled untrue accusations with the intention of
doing harm did in fact abuse his freedom of speech. 1 9 On the other hand, his freedom
of speech, an attribute of being a citizen, is enjoyed and expressed, except in cases of
abuse, both in and out of the company.' 20 Judges are to carry out a measured balance of
control vis-A-vis infringements against freedom of speech, based on Article L. 1121-1
(former Article L. 120-2) of the Labor Code: "Nothing can place restrictions on the
rights of individuals and on individual and collective liberties unless justified by the
nature of the task to accomplish and in proportion to the goal pursued.',
121
As in American law, it is outside of the workplace that freedom of speech has the
furthest reach and is the least susceptible of being cause for dismissal. Thus, a judge
cannot be content with merely observing the trouble created in a company due to the
participation of an employee in a public demonstration, without indicating how, taking
into consideration the employee's job function and nature of the business, the work
connection alone could justify the employer's banning the exercise of a collective
liberty outside of work hours.122 Totally opposite from American law, French law does
not strip the worker from his right to freedom of speech within the framework of his
professional duties. The employee remains a full citizen.
118. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court of ordinary jurisdiction,
social chamber], Dec. 14, 1999, Bull. civ. V, No. 488.
119. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court ofordinaryjurisdiction,
social chamber], Nov. 16, 1993, Bull. civ. V, No. 278.
120. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court ofordinayjurisdiction, social
chamber], Oct. 5, 2004, No. 02-44487, available at
http:lwww.legfrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURrrEXTOOOO
07482714&fastReqId= 1924893115&fastPos=3.
121. C. TRAv. art. L. 1121-1.
122. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court ofordinaryjurisdiction,
social chamber], May 23, 2007, No. 05-41375, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction-rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEX
T000007531940&fastReqld=248207328&fastPos= I.
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In 1988, the famous Clavaud ruling attested to the vigor of freedom of speech for
employees. In this case, an employee working for the Dunlop Company decided to
publish an article in the Humanity newspaper (which was tied to the French
Communist Party), describing in critical fashion one of his nights at work. The Court of
Cassation considered that the employee had acted within the limits of his right to
freedom of expression, a right accorded to all citizens, and thus could express an
opinion on his work conditions without violating his duty of company loyalty.'23 The
court has also held that an employee could not be held at fault for sending a letter to
the government inspector in charge of monitoring compliance with health, safety, and
labor legislation to report instances of embezzlement, money mishandling, or
misappropriation of funds committed by the employer.
24
The same would apply to an employee who denounces directly to the Public
Prosecutor acts of mistreatment and victimization of elderly people living in an
institution for the handicapped, 125 provided that the accusations are not false and the
employee acted in good faith. Generally speaking, the employee who alerts "the higher
echelons of management in good faith informing them of events in relation to his area
of competence' 126 commits no wrongdoing. This rule completely contradicts Ceballos,
which takes public employee "whistleblowers" out of the realm of the First
Amendment when expressing themselves "pursuant to their official duties.' 27 For the
French judge, and in contrast to the American federal judge (although not officially
disputed by the latter), the employee remains a "citizen" within the framework of his
professional activity.
Freedom of expression thus succeeds in covering, without reserve, genuine
instances of whistleblowing. This is why it is superfluous in France, unlike in the
United States, to enact myriad laws that protect whistleblowers. However, French
legislators have occasionally given in to temptation. For example, Law No. 2007-1598
of November 13, 2007,128 regarding the fight against corruption, resolved that no
123. See Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court of ordinary
jurisdiction, social chamber], Apr. 28, 1988, Bull. civ. V, No. 257.
124. See Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court of ordinary
jurisdiction, social chamber], Mar. 14, 2000, Bull. civ. V, No. 104; cf Cour de cassation,
Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court of ordinary jurisdiction, social chamber], Dec. 18,
2002, No. 01-40498, available at
http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldActionrechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXTOOOO
07439526&fastReqld=1081556811 &fastPos=l. The case involved a psychologist who worked
in a children's nursery. The psychologist denounced the dysfunctional behaviors present at the
nursery and "notified her managerial superiors for a long time and on several occasions, to no
avail." Id.
125. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court of ordinary jurisdiction,
social chamber], July 12, 2006, Bull. civ. V, No. 245.
126. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court ofordinaryjurisdiction,
social chamber], Nov. 8, 2006, Bull. civ. V, No. 331. The case involved an employee in charge
of ensuring ethical compliance who had placed into the very hands of the company president a
confidential letter in which she drew his attention to racial comments made by the hiring
manager.
127. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
128. Law No. 2007-1598 of Nov. 13, 2007, Journal Officiel de la R6publique Fran~aise
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Nov. 14, 2007, p. 18648. Article 9 of Law No. 2007-1598
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individual could be rejected from the recruitment process, punished, discharged, or
directly or indirectly discriminated against "for having in good faith recounted or given
evidence of, whether to his employer or to the legal and administrative authorities, acts
of corruption learned about during the exercise of his job duties.' '129 In reality,
however, this innovation results from Article 9 of the Civil Law Convention on
Corruption of the Council of Europe of November 4, 1999, which invites member
states to make provisions within their domestic law for "appropriate protection against
any unjustified sanction for employees who have reasonable grounds to suspect
corruption and who report in good faith their suspicion to responsible persons or
authorities."' 130 But, identical protection had already been granted by law to employees
having testified to incidents of unlawful discrimination' 31 or of sexual or psychological
harassment. 1
32
Exercise of the freedom of expression, like that of freedom of speech, is guaranteed
through the threat of a particularly stiff penalty: the nullification of the discriminatory
measure. Specifically, an invalid dismissal, by virtue of a legal text or due to an
infringement of a fundamental liberty, 133 entitles the employee the right of
reinstatement, with retroactive salary paid from the time of dismissal to reinstatement,
if so requested.
If there was once a period in time when, because of his status as a member of top
management, a high-level executive was not counted among company personnel and
deprived of the right to strike as well as of the freedom of expression, that time is over.
French law excludes no category of employees from the realm of the freedom of
expression, contrary to the NLRA, which does not apply to supervisors. 134 Thus, the
following do not constitute abuses of the freedom of expression:
* When an administrative or financial director who sits on the board of
directors remits to its members a document criticizing the new organization
put into place by management, refraining from using harmful, defamatory,
or excessive language;
" When a financial director sends a letter sharp in tone but polite and solely
for internal use, with the purpose of expressing his disagreement regardingU T6
the resolution of problems; or
created C. TRAV. art. L. 1161-1.
129. Id.
130. Civil Law Convention on Corruption, Nov. 4, 1999, Europ. T.S. No. 174, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/htm-/174.htm.
131. C. TRAv. art. L. 1132-3 (former art. L. 122-45, line 3).
132. C. TRAv. art. L. 1152-2 (former art. L. 122-49, line 2).
133. The judge can only nullify a dismissal and order the continuation of a contractual
relationship by virtue of a law or in the case of a violation of a "fundamental liberty." Cour de
cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court of ordinary jurisdiction, social chamber],
Mar. 13, 2001, Bull. civ. V, No. 87.
134. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2000).
135. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court ofordinaryjurisdiction,
social chamber], Dec. 14, 1999, Bull civ. V, No. 488.
136. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court of ordinaryjurisdiction,
social chamber], May 10, 2006, No. 04-47772, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEX
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* When during a meeting, a high-level executive disputes the general
manager's comments on a technical question, thus implicating one of his
colleagues without using defamatory, harmful, or excessive language.
137
Punishable abuses of freedom of expression are of different types. First, the use of
harmful, offensive, or dishonorable language constitutes real and serious grounds for
dismissal, and indeed, gross misconduct. Gross misconduct results from an attitude
denoting the deliberate intent to provoke or create disorder through a documented act
of insubordination. Thus, dismissal of an employee is justified:
" When an employee publishes an article in a reputable national newspaper
implicating the company and his colleagues calling them, "a bunch of
whoremongers," "two-faced bastards," and "first-class collaborators";
138
* When an employee uses racial slurs; 139 or
" When an employee writes that he feels it is urgent to distance himself from
company managers with whom he shares "neither the same code of ethics or
civic sense most notably manifested via the repeated juggling of the
company books;" these remarks comprise "the imputation of acts contrary
to honor and respect."
140
On the contrary, breaking the work contract is not justified in the following cases:
* When an employee strongly reacts to his employer's decision to release him
from his work duties, states that he will not stay, and throws his work keys
on the table instead of returning them as asked;1
4 1
T000007504902&fastReqld=1297586853&fastPos=l.
137. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court of ordinaryjurisdiction,
social chamber], June 7, 2006, No. 04-45781, available at
http://www.legifiance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEX
T000007496986&fastReqld= 1968222850&fastPos=3.
138. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court of ordinary jurisdiction,
social chamber], July 6, 2005, No. 04-46085, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEX
T000007509697&fastReqld=1206373701&fastPos=1.
139. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court of ordinaryjurisdiction,
social chamber], Apr. 6, 2004, No. 02-41166, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/afichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEX
T000007472628&fastReqId=1730427480&fastPos=l.
140. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court of ordinary jurisdiction,
social chamber], Oct. 30, 2002, No. 00-40868, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEX
T000007444573&fastReqld=863144119&fastPos=l.
141. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court of ordinaryjurisdiction,
social chamber], Mar. 16, 2004, No. 01-46316, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction-rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEX
T000007473526&fastReqld=1411019906&fastPos=l.
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" When an employee sends numerous letters within a short period of time to
his employer in response to a job warning that the employee deemed
unjustified. The letters contained no harmful, defamatory, or excessive
language;142 or
" When employee distributes an open letter in response to one previously sent
by management to the entire work staff personally implicating him. The
employee's complaints were not excessive in nature in the letter and were in
proportion to the emotional trauma endured after having his professional
work ethic and ability called into question, even though his work
performance until then had never been a cause for reproach. 
143
Finally, the criticisms addressed to company management by the employee must not
degenerate into an excessive denigration or undermining of management. Thus, the
remarks contained in an employee's letter, denigrating his boss and going beyond
acceptable limits, amount to an abuse of the employee's right of expression.
144
Moreover, it was considered a case of gross misconduct when the managing director on
several occasions "publicly challenged the competence and legitimacy of new company
managers" and "as a result, went beyond the limits of the freedom of speech granted to
an employee."'' 45 The gross misconduct stems from the deliberate intention to harm a
superior, by denigrating both him or her personally and the manner in which he or she
is running the company in front of other employees. 146 In a questionable ruling, the
Court of Cassation even validated a disciplinary measure taken against a Syrian airline
employee guilty of having expressed discourteous comments toward the Syrian Head
of State. 147 Although the Clavaud ruling 48 has often been introduced as precedent, case
142. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court ofordinaryjurisdiction,
social chamber], May 2, 2001, Bull. civ. V, No. 142.
143. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court of ordinaryjurisdiction,
social chamber], June 22, 2004, Bull. civ. V, No. 175.
144. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court of ordinary jurisdiction,
social chamber], Feb. 9, 2000, No. 97-43664, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEX
T000007405242&fastReqld=l 711149365&fastPos=l.
145. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court of ordinary jurisdiction,
social chamber], June 12, 2007, No. 05-45333, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEX
T000007512255&fastReqld=1646052972&fastPos=l.
146. See Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court of ordinary
jurisdiction, social chamber], Jan. 20, 1993, No. 91-42005, available at
http://www.legifiance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEX
T000007174791 &fastReqld=1967343848&fastPos=l; Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of
appeal] Paris, Sept. 16, 2003. This second case involved a letter sent by an employee that
questioned the basic elements of a corporate business plan. The letter used excessive and
defamatory language by casting suspicion on the president of the board of directors. Because of
the manner in which the letter was disseminated (reading it out loud to members of the board of
directors), the letter's author had decided to make known his diverging views from the
management team to the company auditor and to the entire staff, thus attempting to destabilize
the company.
147. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court of ordinary jurisdiction,
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law has frequently recognized that the behavior or comments of employees do, in fact,
constitute an abuse of the right to free expression. 149 However, "a simple indiscretion
in speech, even one made in public, would not be enough to characterize an abuse of
the right of freedom of speech which is enjoyed by the employee, both within and
outside of the company.'
5 0
2. Public Servants
"The freedom to express one's opinion is guaranteed to government workers,"
affirms Article 6 of the general statute of civil service workers for the state and its
territorial communities.' 15 Nevertheless, French administrative law imposes a "duty of
confidentiality" on all public servants (permanent or contractual), requiring them to
refrain from expressing their opinions about their department, at all times and in all
places, even outside of work and the performance of their job duties, under penalty of
demotion and disciplinary action. This obligation was defined and sanctioned for the
first time by the Council of State in the Bouzanguet decision 152 and has been constantly
affirmed ever since. It does not appear in the general statute of civil service workers,
but it does appear in specific legal texts (e.g., statutes of the magistracy, decisions of
the Council of State, military service, and in the code of ethics of the national police).
Obviously, a criminal offense constitutes a breach of confidentiality, such as
defamatory remarks153 or an offense against the head of state. 154 In other cases, there is
cause to make reference to the circumstances surrounding the event (e.g., the nature of
the duties and job responsibilities held, the place where the opinion was expressed and
the publicity arising from it, and the possible use of a union mandate). The duty of
confidentiality becomes all the more intense the higher the ranking of the civil
servant.155 Participating in a prohibited demonstration' 56 or distributing tracts that
social chamber], Oct. 6, 1993, No. 91-45053, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEX
T000007205764&fastReqld=1 239284207&fastPos=l.
148. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court of ordinary jurisdiction,
social chamber], Apr. 28, 1988, Bull. civ. V., No. 257.
149. See, e.g., Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court of ordinary
jurisdiction, social chamber], Mar. 28, 2000, No. 97-42943, available at
http://www.legifiance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEX
T000007405804&fastReqld=1927573160&fastPos=l; Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale
[Cass. soc.] [highest court of ordinary jurisdiction, social chamber], Oct. 7, 1997, Bull. civ. V,
No. 303; Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court of ordinary jurisdiction,
social chamber], Nov. 16, 1993, Bull. civ. V, No. 278.
150. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court ofordinaryjurisdiction,
social chamber], Jan. 9, 2002, No. 99-45875, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEX
T000007449205&fastReqld=2115295073&fastPos=l.
151. Law No. 83-634 of July 13, 1983, Journal Officiel de la Rdpublique Frangaise [J.O.]
[Official Gazette of France], July 14, 1983, p. 2174.
152. Conseil d'Etat [CE] [highest administrative court], Jan. 11, 1935, Rec. Lebon 44.
153. Conseil d'Etat [CE] [highest administrative court], Feb. 11, 1953, Rec. Lebon 709.
154. Conseil d'Etat [CE] [highest administrative court], Jan. 10, 1969, Rec. Lebon 24.
155. See Conseil d'Etat [CE] [highest administrative court], Mar. 10, 1971, Rec. Lebon 202;
Conseil d'Etat [CE] [highest administrative court], Mar. 13, 1953, Rec. Lebon 133.
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incite others to participate in a political strike 157 also constitute a breach of
confidentiality. Generally speaking, the public servant must abstain discrediting the job
or department. A public servant who violently criticizes his minister's management
style through pamphlets or by participating in an electoral meeting 158 breaches the duty
of confidentiality, just like the departmental manager of the archives department who
sends a letter to another department manager on official letterhead vehemently
criticizing the government's archive policy.' 59 These behaviors are similar to those
punished in labor law. Breaching the duty of confidentiality is nothing other than the
flip side of abusing the freedom of speech.
As in American law, the situation ofpublic employees is clearly distinguished from
that of private employees. The mission of public service confers a particular dimension
and seriousness to the concept of subordination. The purpose of subordination is to
demand obedience and discipline of personnel not in one's own interest, but in the
general interest. Beyond this common distinction, French and American law diverge
widely, as much as they do on the issue of private employees. Public employees remain
regarded, in all circumstances, as citizens enjoying the freedom of speech. The
balancing of interests-so familiar in American law, where it was originally
conceived-remains the preferred reasoning. On the contrary, it has been disdained in
the United States ever since the Ceballos ruling.
II. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH OF EMPLOYEES
The topic of electronic surveillance of workers is often linked to the right to privacy
because it is evident that surveillance severely restricts workers' freedom of speech. 60
In the United States, very few laws regulate the electronic surveillance of workers. At
the federal level, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) only limits
"interceptions" of electronic communications.' 6 1 Providers of electronic
communication services may intercept electronic communications if doing so is
necessary for the performance of service or necessary to protect their rights or
property. 162 An employer can utilize this exception from the moment that the message
he intercepts circulates within his own computer system.' 63 "Intercept" implies
assuming control over the contentious message while it is in transit; however,
156. Conseil d'Etat [CE] [highest administrative court], May 27, 1955, Rec. Lebon 297.
157. Conseil d'Etat [CE] [highest administrative court], Oct. 12, 1956, Rec. Lebon 362.
158. See Conseil d'Etat [CE] [highest administrative court], Apr. 4, 1973, Rec. Lebon 283
(holding that the opposite applies to the reading of a union motion by a professor); Conseil
d'Etat [CE] [highest administrative court], Jan. 3, 1962, Rec. Lebon 365.
159. Conseil d'Etat [CE] [highest administrative court], June 2, 1989, Rec. Lebon No.
70084.
160. Yamada, supra note 5, at 17 ("[E]lectronic surveillance in the workplace severely chills
employee free speech.").
161. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2006).
162. Id. § 2511 (2)(a)(i) ("It shall not be unlawful... for an operator of a switchboard, or an
officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communication service, whose
facilities are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic communication, to intercept,
disclose, or use that communication in the normal course of his employment while engaged in
any activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of
the rights or property of the provider of that service .... ").
163. See Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2003).
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information that has already been stored (e-mails stored on a hard disk, for example)
can be freely read by the employer. 164 Connecticut adopted a law in 1987 that banned
the surveillance of employees "in areas designed for the health or personal comfort of
the employees or for safeguarding their possessions"'1 65 and subjected the recording or
listening of conversations relative to negotiation of the work contract to the consent of
the interested party.166 But the field of interdictions is narrow with regard to the variety
of data that can be monitored. 
167
A recent decision of the NLRB, handed down on December 16, 2007, sheds some
light on the matter of e-mails. 168 Among the various resolutions upheld, two in
particular merit attention. First, employees cannot demand the use of their employer's
e-mail system in order to exercise the rights listed in section 7 of the NLRA (the
freedom to establish unions and become a member, the right to participate in collective
bargaining negotiations, or to lead a concerted activity). 169 Second, the NLRB had
already refused to grant to employees engaged in collective action the right to use a
billboard, television, copy machine, or telephone belonging to their employer, and
permitted the employer to restrict usage of these items for professional purposes
only. 
70
In this instance, the NLRB considered that the more frequent use of e-mail in the
workplace has not extinguished other more traditional methods of communication
existing among employees. As a result, the NLRB found that free e-mail usage should
not be offered to employees contrary to the employer's wishes. Moreover, the
employer's policy of prohibiting the use of e-mail for "solicitations" unrelated to work
does not disregard section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, which categorizes a situation whereby
an employer interferes, restricts, or restrains employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed by section 7 as an unfair labor practice.
171
French law offers a striking contrast in that its Court of Cassation has been
passionate about this issue since 2001. French case law today has two series of
precedents, each with three proposals. In essence, the employer cannot implement an
employee surveillance system without first fulfilling three obligations-namely,
information, consultation, and declaration.
First, the employer must personally inform the employee in advance.
According to Article L. 121-8 of the Labor Code, "no information
personally concerning an employee or ajob candidate can be collected by a
method that has not been brought in advance to the attention of the
employee or job candidate." 172
164. Id. at 113-14.
165. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-48b(b) (2003).
166. See id. § 31-48b(d).
167. These data include telephone conversations, e-mails, hard disks, geographical location
of the employee through GPS, the comings and goings on the premises using a coded badge
system, or biometric information.
168. Guard Publ'g Co., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 70 (Dec. 16, 2007).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2000).
172. C. TRAv. art. L. 121-8.
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" Second, the employer must inform and consult in advance with the labor-
management committee (if the employer has at least fifty employees).
According to Article L. 432-2-1 of the Labor Code, "the labor-management
committee is to be informed and consulted prior to the decision to
implement within the company methods and techniques enabling the
monitoring of employee activity."173 If the labor-management committee is
not informed, the recordings from a customer video surveillance system put
into place by an employer that are also used to monitor employees would
constitute an unlawful means of proof to support a job dismissal.1 74
* Third, declaration to the CNIL is mandatory in cases where personal data
are to be automatically processed.1
75
Basically, three other proposals demarcate the field of the right to privacy:
* First, according to the Nikon ruling, an employee "has the right, even
during work hours and on work premises, to respect for his private life; this
means in particular the confidentiality of his correspondence; the employer
cannot henceforth without violating this fundamental freedom access the
personal messages sent and received by the employee because of a
computer tool placed at his disposal for work and this applies even in cases
where the employer has prohibited nonprofessional use of the computer."'
176
" Second, the files are presumed to be of a professional nature unless
explicitly stated otherwise by the employee: The files and records created
by an employee thanks to the computer tool put at his disposal by the
employer in order to perform his work duties are presumed, unless
identified by the employee as being personal, to be of a professional nature
such that the employer can access them in his absence. 177 According to a
clarification inserted in the 2006 Annual Report of the Court of Cassation,
"such identification must occur by means of a specific mention or heading,
173. C. TRAv. art. L. 432-2-1.
174. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court of ordinaryjurisdiction,
social chamber], June 7, 2006, Bull. civ. V, No. 206.
175. See Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court of ordinary
jurisdiction, social chamber], Apr. 6, 2004, Bull. civ. V, No. 103. An employee who was
dismissed without real and serious cause due to his refusal to swipe his badge at the company
exit as required by internal regulation was erroneously dismissed.
The combination of articles 16, 27 and 34 of law no. 78-17 of January 6, 1978
relative to information technology, files and liberties, 226-16 of the Criminal
Code, L. 121-8 and L. 432-2-1 of the Labor Code [means] that in the absence of a
declaration to the French National Data Protection Agency (CNIL) regarding the
automatic processing of personal data concerning an employee, his refusal to defer
to the employer's demand involving the implementation of said data processing
can not be held against him.
Id.
176. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court of ordinary jurisdiction,
social chamber], Oct. 1, 2002, Bull. civ. V, No. 291.
177. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court of ordinary jurisdiction,
social chamber], Oct. 18, 2006, Bull. civ. V, No. 308.
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or the creation of an ad hoc file by the employee and not simply by filing
the document, for example, in the 'my documents' folder that most
programs automatically include."'
78
Third, the employer cannot open personal files outside of the presence of
the employee "without a specific risk or imminent danger" necessitating
such action.179 This necessity was found in a similar situation when it was
judged that a series of terrorist attempts had warranted a company targeted
by bomb alerts to demand that employees open, only on a temporary basis,
their bags in front of security agents. "This measure, justified by
exceptional circumstances and security requirements was in proportion to
the end goal since it ruled out bag searches." As a consequence, the refusal
of an employee to show the contents of his bag, apart from any union
activity, was wrong.I0
Thus, French law rests on a distinction that is between the work-related and
personal or nonwork-related domains. In addition, two general rules frame the
permissible grounds for employee dismissal:
" Employees cannot be dismissed as a result of disciplinary action founded
upon the "personal life" of the employee (an expression deliberately
preferred to that of "private life" as it is more encompassing).
" A dismissal as a result of disciplinary action can only be pronounced when
the "personal life" of an employee causes "objective unrest" within the
company or violates a contractual obligation.
Thus, for example, "the receipt of a [pornographic] magazine which an employee
had sent to his work place [where it was openly viewed by his colleagues] does not
constitute a breach of his contractual obligations."'' l Likewise, sending an e-mail that
constitutes a misdemeanor does justify the disciplinary action of dismissal vis-A-vis the
sender because a criminal offense inevitably goes beyond the scope of one's personal
life. Thus, "an employee who uses electronic mail made available to him by his
employer in order to send anti-Semitic messages in such a way that the employer is
identified, necessarily constitutes a case of gross misconduct."'
8 2
Throughout its decisions, the Court of Cassation has been mindful to apply a
measured degree of proportionality with respect to infringements of liberties
committed by the employer. The court takes its source from Article L. 1121-1 (former
Article L. 120-2) of the Labor Code, according to which "[n]othing can place
178. LA COUR DE CASSATION ET LA CONSTRUCTION JURIDIQUE EUROPEENNE, RAPPORT
ANNUEL 2006, at 305 (2006).
179. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court of ordinaryjurisdiction,
social chamber], May 17, 2005, Bull. civ. V, No. 165.
180. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court of ordinaryjurisdiction,
social chamber], Apr. 3, 2001, Bull. civ. V, No. 115.
181. Cour de cassation, Chambre mixte [Cass. ch. mixte] [highest court of ordinary
jurisdiction, mixed chamber], May 18, 2007, Bull. 2007, Chambre mixte, No. 3.
182. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.] [highest court ofordinaryjurisdiction,
social chamber], June 2, 2004, Bull. civ. V, No. 152.
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restrictions on the rights of individuals and on individual and collective liberties unless
justified by the nature of the task to be accomplished and in proportion to the goal
pursued."183 This measured control of proportionality strongly evokes the balancing of
interests which American judges lean on when reconciling the rights of workers with
those of public sector employers.'
84
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the methods of reasoning that outline the contours of freedom of
speech in United States and French law are generally similar. An infinite number of
reasoning methods cannot exist, as the mind always takes the same roads, whether
these roads are beaten paths or side streets. Nevertheless, the conclusions of the judges
do strongly diverge, influenced by the current of history, a constitutional system, and
an economy and culture that have shaped and produced profoundly dissimilar court
decisions.
183. C. TRAv. art. L. 1121-1 (former art. L. 120-2).
184. See supra text accompanying note 15; cf Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505
(N.J. 1980).
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